Consensus
Last updated
Last updated
Datamall Chain adopts Nash-Consensus to solve the problem of data homogeneity on the chain, allowing users to set different reliability and performance for different types of data and pay different costs and improving the overall efficiency of storage. Storage demanders and storage providers can be matched through Nash-Consensus and each kind of storage need will be satisfied.
The Nash-Consensus of DMC has the following three aspects:
1. Price game
The storage provider can freely set the price per unit of storage space, and the storage demander can also freely choose the storage provider.
2. Guarantee game
When a storage provider offers storage space, a certain amount of DMC must be deposited as a guarantee. If the storage provider loses data during the contract period, the deposit will be paid to the data owner. However, the amount of the deposit is not mandatory, storage providers can set the deposit amount based on the market and their storage capacity.
3. Off-chain storage challenge game
Nash-Consensus is in line with the principle of “matters are only put on the chain when there is a dispute”. After the storage demander signs a contract with the storage provider, the storage demander can initiate off-chain storage challenge to the storage provider, which minimizes the burden on the chain to achieve higher scalability.
The decentralized storage service network uses the Proof of Storage Service (PoSS) algorithm for consensus. Top miner nodes are ranked to become super-nodes, specifically, based on the amount of PST minted by pledged DMC, a corresponding number of votes are generated, thus the nodes are ranked according to the storage delivery capability. It is the goal of the project to entice miners with ability to provide secure and reliable storage service, so the super-nodes (consensus nodes) are vital to the success of the project.
In order to build a decentralized storage market that can evolve and flourish benignly, it is necessary to provide incentives for both sides of the storage transaction. We propose an incentive for real storage transaction behavior, called Real Storage Incentive (RSI).
The reward is divided into the following three parts:
l Liquidity Reward
PST is minted by miners through staking DMC. In order to increase the supply and liquidity of PST, miners and LPs work together to stake DMC to mint PST. Therefore, after the PST is successfully minted, the miners can get the RSI rewards from the system by publishing their storage service capabilities, and the rewards will be distributed to the miners and the LPs according to the stake ratio of DMC tokens or the negotiated ratio q between the two parties. Meanwhile, a delayed-releasing reward model is set to avoid pending malicious orders, under which the release ratio of the reward will be based on the market order price as the benchmark price to set the incentive range of miners' order.
l Data Storage Reward
After the MC (Miner the Consumer)has finished storing the data, the system will reward the MC with a certain amount of RSI after the storage challenge verifies that the data has indeed been stored successfully.
l Storage Service Reward
For MPs (Miner the Provider), after the storage service is successfully completed and storage challenge won, the system will reward MPs with a certain amount of RSI. The reward is distributed to the miners and LPs according to the proportion of staked DMC or a ratio q negotiated by both parties.
PoSS and the storage transaction model in DMC ensure fair incentives, yet also provide mechanisms to prevent malicious attacks, such as Node hijacked attack and Collusion attack.
Node hijacked attack
Since PoSS is a consensus mechanism, a super-node may carry out external attacks to destroy network services, especially if it obtains voting power. However, since the status of the super-node is qualified via DMC tokens staked, the cost of the attack is extremely high, unless the node is hijacked by hackers.
Collusion attack
Since a certain number of miners are selected to serve as super-nodes, if more than two-thirds of the super-nodes conspire, it might cast votes to harm the interests of most MCs(Miner the Consumer) and other MPs(Miner the provider), leading to potential block forks or DMC depreciation, which will hurt the conspirers in return.
